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We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986)
hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs
and  monitoring  costs.  We  model  this  tradeoff  dynamically.  We  assume  that  early  on  in  the
production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing
funds from the firm which dissipates over time. We assume that they also face an agency friction
which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. The problem of determining the
optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a
problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to
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We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the ﬁrm and the optimal
compensation of the ﬁrm’s managers based on Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis that a ﬁrm’s choice
of capital structure is determined by a trade-oﬀ between agency costs and monitoring costs.
We model this trade-oﬀ dynamically by assuming that outside investors in a ﬁrm face diﬀerent
obstacles to recouping their investment at diﬀerent times. Early on in the production process,
outside investors face an information friction – the output of the ﬁrm is private information
to the manager of the ﬁrm unless the outside investors pay a ﬁxed cost to monitor the ﬁrm.
With time, the output of the ﬁrm is revealed to outside investors and, hence, the information
friction disappears. At this later stage in the production process however, outside investors
face an agency friction – the ﬁrm’s manager can divert resources not paid out to investors
in the early phases of production towards perquisites that provide him with private beneﬁts.
The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the ﬁrm as well as the optimal
compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors
and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions.
Our theory is developed in an dynamic optimal contracting framework, and, as a
result, our model yields predictions about the joint dynamics of a ﬁrm’s capital structure
and its executive compensation. The choice of compensation for the manager is shaped by
the assumption that the manager is risk averse while the outside investors are risk neutral.
Our theory has the following implications regarding optimal capital structure and executive
compensation. Each period, the payouts from the ﬁrm can be divided into payments to the
manager that consist of a non-contingent base pay and a performance component of pay based
on the realized output of the ﬁrm, as well as two distinct payments to the outside investorsthat resemble payments to debt and outside equity respectively. The debt-like payment to
outside investors is made early in the period. It comes in the form of a ﬁx e dl u m p–t h e
failure of which to pay leads to monitoring. The equity-like payment to outside investors
comes in the form of a residual which depends upon the performance of the ﬁrm and is paid
at the end of the period.
In our model, the fact that the manager receives some form of performance based
pay is not motivated by the desire to induce the manager to exert greater eﬀort or care in
managing the ﬁrm. Instead, the performance based component of the manager’s pay simply
serves to induce the manager to forsake expenditures on perquisites for his own enjoyment.
Hence, our model’s predictions for whether it is optimal to have the performance component
of the manager’s compensation depend on the total market value of the ﬁrm or on some
narrower measure of current performance such as current sales are determined entirely by our
assumptions regarding the extent of the agency friction. If the manager is able to appropriate
a broad measure of the ﬁrm’s resources for his own beneﬁt, then his performance bonus will
be based on this broad measure. If the manager’s ability to appropriate resources is more
limited in scope, then his bonus pay will be based on this narrower measure of performance.
Our theory also has implications for the relationship between the optimal ﬁnancial
structure of the ﬁrm and its optimal production plan. Our theory predicts that there is a
wedge between the marginal product of capital in the ﬁrm and rental rate on capital that
depends upon the expected monitoring costs associated with bankruptcy and the ineﬃcient
risk-sharing between outside investors and the manager induced by the agency friction. Under
certain parametric assumptions, we are able to compute the magnitude of this wedge between
the marginal product of capital and its rental rate in terms of readily observed features of
2the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure and its executive compensation.
To extend our model to a dynamic setting, we assume that there is an information
cycle in which outside investors ﬁrst face an information friction and then face an agency
friction. This cycle is repeated indeﬁnitely. We associate this cycle with an accounting or
capital budgeting cycle at the ﬁrm. We show the qualitative decomposition of the optimal
contract into four payments – base pay and performance pay for the manager, and debt
and equity-like payments to the outside investors – holds both in a static setting in which
there is only one information cycle, and in a dynamic setting in which there are an arbitrary
number of information cycles. Thus, repetition of our contracting problem does not change,
qualitatively, the interpretation of our eﬃcient contract as a theory of capital structure and
executive compensation.
We derive two additional results in our model in dynamic setting with more than
one information cycle. The ﬁrst of these results is that the compensation of incumbent
managers is non-decreasing over time, regardless of the performance of the ﬁrm. The second
of these results is that incumbent managers are protected against the risk that they become
unproductive with a “golden parachute”.
The result that the pay of the incumbent manager is non-decreasing over time has
implications for the dynamics of the ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure since, ceteris paribus,t h e
dynamics of executive compensation alter the terms of the trade-oﬀ between the information
and agency frictions that outside investors face. In particular, this result implies that if the
ﬁrm is particularly proﬁtable in one period, in the next period, the ﬁrm’s payout shifts away
from debt toward equity.
The result that an incumbent manager that becomes unproductive receives a “golden
3parachute” suﬃcient to maintain the marginal utility of consumption that he enjoyed as
productive manager is a direct consequence of optimal risk sharing. The exact size of the
golden parachute is determined by the outside opportunities of an incumbent manager – if
these outside opportunities are not good, then the manager receives a large golden parachute
while if they are good, then the parachute mandated by optimal risk sharing is smaller.
Our model delivers predictions for the division of payments from the ﬁrm between the
manager, the owners of outside equity, and the owners of the ﬁrm’s debt based on the trade-
oﬀ of information and agency frictions. It is important to note that our dynamic model does
not pin down the debt-equity ratio of the ﬁr m .T h i si sb e c a u s eo u rm o d e ld o e sn o tp i nd o w n
t h es o u r c eo fﬁnancing for ongoing investment in the ﬁr m . W ep r e s e n ta ns i m p l ee x a m p l e
to demonstrate that, holding ﬁxed the division of gross payments to debt and outside equity
holders, the ﬁrm will have a diﬀerent debt-equity ratio depending on whether debt is long
term and ongoing investment is ﬁnanced out of retained earnings or debt is short-term and
ongoing investment is ﬁnanced with new short-term debt. We conjecture that this failure
of our model to pin down the debt-equity ratio of the ﬁrm in a dynamic setting may be a
general aspect of completely speciﬁed “trade-oﬀ”m o d e l so fc o r p o r a t eﬁnance.
T h i sp a p e ri sc o n s i d e r st h eo p t i m a lﬁnancial contract between outside investors and a
manager in the presence of both information and agency frictions when there is the possibility
of monitoring. It is therefore related to a wide range of prior research on each of these topics.
The within period, or static, aspects of the information and monitoring aspect is similar to
Townsend (1979), while the static aspects of the agency friction and the information friction
are similar to Hart and Moore (1995), in that these frictions can rationalize a division of
the ﬁrms output into debt, and other payments.1 However, unlike these prior papers, the
4inclusion of both frictions and monitoring, and the speciﬁc form of these friction leads to
three diﬀerent payment streams coming out of the ﬁrm, outside debt, outside equity, and
managerial compensation.
Since we consider these frictions within a recursive environment, our paper is related
to prior work on dynamic eﬃcient contracting. However, unlike the literature on dynamic
models of eﬃcient ﬁnancial contracting with information frictions, such as Atkeson (1991),
Hopenhayn and Clementi (2002), Demarzo and Fishman (2004) or Wang (2004), our infor-
mation friction is temporary since there is complete information revelation by the end of the
period. As a result, while the costly state veriﬁcation aspect of our model rationalizes outside
debt, the dynamic aspects and the overall tractability of our model are similar to those of the
dynamic enforcement constraint literature, such as Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), and
Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004). In particular, it shares the feature that if the manger
is retained, then his promised utility is weakly increasing over time, and these increases serve
to reduce the extent of the enforcement friction.
In our model contracting is complete subject to explicit information and enforcement
frictions. This is in contrast to a large literature that seeks to explain various aspects of the
ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms as arising from incomplete contracting. Examples include Hart
and Moore (1995,1997), as well as: Aghion and Bolton (1992) which examines the eﬃcient
allocation of control rights, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) in which outside investors choose
their holdings of a debt as opposed to equity claims to generate the eﬃcient decision with
respect to the interference or not in the continuing operation of the ﬁrm, Zweibel (1996) in
which manager uses debt as a means of constraint their future investment choices to be more
eﬃcient.
52. Model
We begin by presenting a one period version of the model. We extend our results to
a dynamic model in a later section.
There is a large number of risk neutral outside investors who are endowed with capital
which they can rent in the market at rental rate r. There is also a large number of identical risk
averse managers. These managers have an outside opportunity that oﬀers them utility U0.
We assume that the managers have a utility function u(c) with u(0) = −∞ and u0(0) = ∞.
There is a production technology that transforms capital and the labor of a manager
into output. The production process takes place over the course of three subperiods within
the period. In the ﬁrst subperiod, a manager is chosen to operate the production technology
and capital K is installed. In the second subperiod, this production technology yields output
y = θF(K)
where θ is a productivity shock that is idiosyncratic to this technology. In this subperiod,
this productivity shock θ and hence, output y as well, is private information to the manager.
The set of possible shocks is an interval given by Θ and the distribution of these shocks has
c.d.f. P with density p and an expected value of one. We assume that there are diminishing
returns to scale in the sense that F00(K) < 0.
In the second sub-period, the outside investors have the option of monitoring the
output of the project to learn the realization of the shock θ (and hence output y as well)
at a cost of γF(K) units of output. At the end of the second subperiod, the manager has
the option of spending up to fraction τ of whatever output of the ﬁrm that he has not paid
6out to the outside investors during this sub-period on perquisites that he alone enjoys. That
output that the manager does not spend on perquisites is productively reinvested in the ﬁrm.
For simplicity, we assume that the gross return on this productive reinvestment in the ﬁrm
between the second and third sub-periods is one.
In the third sub-period, the outside investors can freely observe both the output of the
ﬁrm y = θF(K) and the division of this output between spending on perks for the manager
and productive reinvestment.
The contracting problem between the outside investors and the manager can be de-
scribed as follows. A contract between these parties speciﬁes a level of capital K to be hired
in the ﬁrst subperiod, a decision by the outside investors to monitor m and a payment from
the manager to the outside investors in the second subperiod v, and a payment from the
outside investors to the manager in the third subperiod x.
We assume that the outside investors can commit to a deterministic strategy for paying
the cost to monitor the output of the project in the second sub-period as a function of the
manager’s announcement ˆ θ of the realization of the productivity shock θ. Denote this strategy
by m(ˆ θ) and denote set of announced shocks for which monitoring takes place by M ⊆ Θ.
The payments v from the manager to the outside investors in the second subperiod
are contingent on the manager’s announcement of the productivity shock ˆ θ as well as the
outcome of the monitoring decision. Let v0(ˆ θ) denote the payment that the manager makes
to the outside investors in the second sub-period as a function of the announcement ˆ θ in case
monitoring does not take place, and let v1(ˆ θ,θ) denote the payment that the manager makes
as a function both of the announcement ˆ θ and the true value of θ in case monitoring does
take place.
7Finally, let x(ˆ θ,θ) denote the payment from the outside investors to the manager in
the third subperiod as a function of his report ˆ θ in the second sub-period and the realized
production shock θ. Note that it is not necessary for x to depend on the monitoring decision
because the true value of θ is revealed to outside investors in the third sub-period at zero
cost.
For reasons of limited liability, we require
v0(ˆ θ) ≤ ˆ θF(K),v 1(ˆ θ,θ) ≤ θF(K), and x(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ 0. (1)
We assume, without loss of generality, that x(ˆ θ,θ) is chosen to ensure that the manager
chooses not to take any perks for himself. This assumption implies a constraint on x(ˆ θ,θ)
that
u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) ≥ u(τ(θF(K) − v0(ˆ θ))) for all ˆ θ / ∈ M, and (2)
u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) ≥ u(τ(θF(K) − v1(ˆ θ,θ))) for all ˆ θ ∈ M.
Given the terms of the contract, m, v0,v 1, and x, the manager chooses a strategy for
reporting θ denoted σ(θ). We say that the report σ(θ)=ˆ θ is feasible given v0 and θ if either
ˆ θ ∈ M or ˆ θ / ∈ M and v0(ˆ θ) ≤ θF(K). Note that this deﬁnition requires that the manager has
the resources to make the payment v0(σ(θ)) in the event that he reports σ(θ)=ˆ θ / ∈ M. We
restrict the manager to choose a reporting strategies such that σ(θ) is feasible given v0 for
all θ. We interpret this constraint as following from the assumption that there is an optimal
contract in which the outside investors choose to monitor if the manager announces ˆ θ / ∈ M
8but then does not pay v0(ˆ θ) and that x(ˆ θ,θ)=0in this event.
We restrict attention to contracts in which the manager truthfully reports θ. Hence,
we impose the incentive constraint
u(x(θ,θ)) ≥ u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ and feasible ˆ θ given θ and v0. (3)
The manager’s expected utility under the contract is given by the expectation of u(x(θ,θ)).
Since managers have an outside opportunity that delivers them utility U0, we require the
individual rationality constraint
Z
u(x(θ,θ))p(θ)dθ ≥ U0. (4)
Note that this contracting problem is a partial equilibrium problem in the sense we
assume that the outside investors have already purchased this production opportunity from
the entrepreneur who created it and now they simply seek to design a contract with the
manager that they hire on a competitive market to run this production opportunity. We
do not model the costs that entrepreneurs pay to create these production opportunities nor
the price that they receive when they sell a newly created production opportunity to outside
investors.
93. Characterizing an eﬃcient contract
In this section, we characterize a contract that maximizes the expected payoﬀ to the
outside investors
Z
[(θ − γm(θ))F(K) − x(θ,θ)]p(θ)dθ − rK (5)
subject to the constraints (1), (2), (3), and (4) in the following two propositions. We refer to
such a contract as an eﬃcient contract.
Proposition 1. There is an eﬃcient contract with the following properties: (i) v1(ˆ θ,θ)=
θF(K) for all ˆ θ ∈ M and v0(ˆ θ)=θ∗F(K) for all ˆ θ / ∈ M, where θ∗ =i n f
n
ˆ θ|ˆ θ / ∈ M
o
,
(ii) M is an interval ranging from 0 to θ∗, and (iii) for ˆ θ 6= θ,x (ˆ θ,θ)=0if ˆ θ ≤ θ∗ and
x(ˆ θ,θ)=τ(θ − θ∗)F(K) if θ > θ∗.
Proof: To prove (i), we ﬁrst consider the case of reports that lead to monitoring. For all
ˆ θ ∈ M, setting v1(ˆ θ,θ)=θF(K) relaxes the constraint (2) as much as possible and has
no eﬀect on the objective (5) nor on any other constraint. Hence we can, without loss of
generality, assume that v1 h a st h i sf o r m .
Next, consider the case of reports that don’t lead to monitoring. Let v∗
0 =i n f
n
v0(ˆ θ)|ˆ θ / ∈ M
o
.
Note that for all θ <v ∗
0/F(K), it is not feasible for the manager to report ˆ θ / ∈ M since the
manager would be unable to make the payment v0(ˆ θ) ≥ v∗
0 in that case. This implies that
v∗
0 ≤ θF(K) for all θ / ∈ M since, otherwise, truthtelling would not be feasible. From (2) and
10(3), for all θ ≥ v∗
0/F(K), we have that
x(θ,θ) ≥ sup
ˆ θ/ ∈M
x(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ τ (θF(K) − v
∗
0), (6)
since the manager can, with strategic reporting of ˆ θ, ensure that the payment that he makes
to outside investors in the second subperiod is arbitrarily close to v∗
0 a n dt h u se n s u r et h a th e
consumes arbitrarily close to τ (θF(K) − v∗
0) in perks. Since (θF(K)−v∗
0) ≥ (θF(K)−v0(ˆ θ))
for all ˆ θ / ∈ M, we can set v0(ˆ θ) equal to a constant, here v∗
0, without aﬀecting any of the
binding incentive constraints (2). Given a monitoring set M, setting the constant v∗
0 as high
as possible relaxes the constraint (2) as much as possible. Given this, constraint (1) implies
that v∗
0 = θ∗F(K) with θ∗ ≡ inf
n
ˆ θ|ˆ θ / ∈ M
o
is an optimal choice.
To prove that M is an interval, note that if M were to contain some ˜ θ > θ∗, it would
still be the case that, for that ˜ θ,x (˜ θ, ˜ θ) ≥ τ
³
˜ θ − θ∗
´
F(K) since the manager has the option
of reporting any feasible ˆ θ / ∈ M that he chooses and hence ensuring himself of consumption
arbitrarily close to τ
³
˜ θ − θ∗
´
F(K). Hence, it is not possible to relax the constraint (2) for
θ > θ∗ any further by choosing to monitor for that report ˜ θ. Since it is costly to monitor, an
eﬃc i e n tc o n t r a c tm u s th a v e˜ θ / ∈ M for almost all ˜ θ > θ∗. Thus, there is an eﬃcient contract
in which M is an interval ranging from 0 to θ∗.
To ﬁn i s ht h ep r o o f ,o b s e r v et h a tg i v e nt h ei n c e n t i v ec o n s t r a i n t( 3 ) ,w ec a n ,w i t h o u t
loss of generality, set x(ˆ θ,θ) for ˆ θ 6= θ as low as possible to relax this incentive constraint
as much as possible. Hence, it is eﬃcient to set x(ˆ θ,θ)=0for ˆ θ 6= θ and ˆ θ ≤ θ∗, and it
is feasible to do so since, in the event of monitoring, the outside investors take possession
of the output of the ﬁrm and there are no resources for the manager to spend on perks for
11himself. From (2) and the results above, we set x(ˆ θ,θ)=τ(θ − θ∗) for ˆ θ 6= θ and ˆ θ > θ∗.
Here it is not possible to set the manager’s compensation any lower. Note that by setting
x(ˆ θ,θ) in this way, we ensure that any choice of x(θ,θ) that satisﬁes nonnegativity for θ ≤ θ∗
and x(θ,θ) ≥ τ(θ − θ∗)F(K) for θ > θ∗ also satisﬁes both the no perks condition (2) and is
incentive compatible in that it satisﬁes (3). Q.E.D.
With these results, we can restate our optimal contracting problem much more simply
as follows. The problem now is to choose a level of investment K, a monitoring set indexed
by θ∗, and payments to the manager w(θ)=x(θ,θ) to maximize the expected payoﬀ to the
outside investors:
Z
(θF(K) − w(θ))p(θ)dθ − γP(θ
∗)F(K) − rK, (7)
subject to the constraints of individual rationality
Z
u(w(θ))p(θ)dθ ≥ U0 (8)
and a no-perks constraint
u(w(θ)) ≥ u(τ(θ − θ
∗)F(K)) for all θ ≥ θ
∗. (9)
With our assumption that managers’ utility is unbounded below, we know that the limited
liability constraint w(θ) ≥ 0 is not binding.
Given values of θ∗,K, and w(θ) that solve this problem, the contract with M =
{θ|θ ≤ θ∗},v 1(ˆ θ,θ)=θF(K),v 0(ˆ θ)=θ∗F(K),x (θ,θ)=w(θ), x(ˆ θ,θ)=0for ˆ θ 6= θ and
12ˆ θ ≤ θ∗, and x(ˆ θ,θ)=τ(θ − θ∗)F(K) for ˆ θ 6= θ and ˆ θ > θ∗ is an eﬃcient contract.
In the following two sections, we use the ﬁrst order conditions of this simpliﬁed con-
tracting problem to characterize the ﬁnancial structure of this project and the relationship
between ﬁnancial structure and production eﬃciency. To that end, we consider the La-




(θF(K) − w(θ))p(θ)dθ − γP(θ







δ(θ){u(w(θ)) − u(τ(θ − θ
∗)F(K))}p(θ)dθ.
4. Debt, Equity and Executive Compensation
In this section, we interpret the characteristics of the eﬃcient contract in terms of a
contract compensating the manager that consists of a base level of pay and a performance
bonus, a debt contract, and an outside equity contract.
We begin by characterizing managerial compensation under this optimal contract in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under an optimal contract, the payments to the manager w(θ) have the
form w(θ)=¯ w for θ ≤ ¯ θ and w(θ)=τ(θ − θ∗)F(K) for θ > ¯ θ, where ¯ θ is the solution to
¯ w = τ
¡¯ θ − θ∗¢
F(K).
13Proof: The ﬁrst-order conditions of (10) with respect to w(θ) are given by
1=( λ + δ(θ))u
0 (w(θ)). (11)
This ﬁrst order condition implies that w(θ) is constant for all values of θ such that the
constraint (9) does not bind (δ(θ)=0 ) . We denote this constant by ¯ w. Given ¯ w, the constraint
(9) binds for θ > ¯ θ and does not bind for θ < ¯ θ. Clearly, w(θ)=τ(θ − θ∗)F(K) when (9)
binds. Q.E.D.
Note that for those values of θ such that the constraint (9) is slack, the ﬁrst order





From proposition 2, we have that the payments made to the manager in the third
sub-period are given by w(θ)=¯ w in the event that θ ≤ ¯ θ and w(θ)=τ(θ − θ∗)F(K)=
τ
¡
θ − ¯ θ
¢
F(K)+ ¯ w in the event that θ > ¯ θ. We interpret the payment ¯ w as the manager’s
base pay and the additional payment to the manager of τ
¡
θ − ¯ θ
¢
F(K) in the event that
θ > ¯ θ as the performance component of the manager’s pay. For the outside investors, the











Note that the manager places a diﬀerent value on these payments because he is risk averse.
As we discus below, this wedge between the valuation of this performance payment by the
14outside investors and the manager plays a role in determining the ﬁrm’s optimal production
plan.
To interpret the other payments under this optimal contract in terms of debt and
e q u i t y ,w em u s te n s u r et h a tp a y m e n t st oo u t s i d ei n v e s t o r sa f t e rt h ei n i t i a li n v e s t m e n ti nt h e
ﬁrst sub-period are non-negative so that they do not violate the limited liability constraint
imposed on investors in corporations. To do so, we assume that the outside investors invest
not only the capital K, but also the uncontingent portion of the manager’s pay ¯ w in the
ﬁrst sub-period. We associate the payments v0 or v1 made by the manager in the second
sub-period as the payments to debt holders. We associate the residual payments to outside
investors as the payments to outside equity.
The payments made in the second sub-period are given by v1(θ,θ)=θF(K) if θ ≤ θ∗
and v0(θ)=θ∗F(K) if θ > θ∗. We interpret θ∗F(K) a st h ef a c ev a l u eo ft h ep r o j e c t ’ sd e b t .
In the event that the realized value of the project exceeds the face value of the debt, the debt
is paid. In the event that the realized value of the project is less than the face value of the
debt, the project is bankrupt, monitored, and all remaining value is paid to the debt holders.
If one assumes that the debt holders bear the cost of monitoring, the market value of the










Note that under the assumption that the debt holders bear the cost of monitoring, the value
of D can be negative since it is net of the cost of monitoring. Alternatively, one may assume
that the outside investors jointly contribute resources γF(K) in addition to uncontingent
15payments K and ¯ w in the ﬁrst sub-period. Under this alternative assumption, the market




θp(θ)dθ +( 1− P(θ
∗))θ




which is always positive. This alternative assumption can also rationalize commitment to
deterministic monitoring since the proceeds from monitoring are nonnegative even if θ =0 ,
and are positive for θ > 0.
The residual payout from the project is associated with the payments to the outside
equity holders. In the event of bankruptcy (θ ≤ θ∗), the outside equity holders receive no
payment. In the event that θ > θ∗ and θ ≤ ¯ θ, the outside equity holders receive payment
(θ − θ∗)F(K), which is the realized value of the project less the payment to the debt holders.
(Recall that the base portion of the manager’s pay, ¯ w, was set aside in advance). In the event
that θ > ¯ θ, the outside equity holders receive
¡
θ − θ∗ − τ
¡
θ − ¯ θ
¢¢
F(K) which is equal to the
realized value of the project less the payments to the debt holders and the payments to the
manager on the performance portion of his compensation.
Note that in our model, the performance component of the manager’s pay resembles an
option on the value of the ﬁrm with strike price ¯ θF(K), or equivalently an option on the value
of the equity of the ﬁrm with strike price
¡¯ θ − θ∗¢
F(K). This result that the performance
component of the manager’s pay resembles an option on the ﬁrm is driven by our assumption
that the agency friction applies to the entire value of the ﬁrm – that is, by our assumption
that the manager can spend up to fraction τ of all of the undisbursed output of the ﬁrm at
the end of the second sub-period.
16More generally, the measure of ﬁrm performance upon which the manager’s perfor-
mance pay is based is determined by the extent of the agency friction. To see this, consider
a variant of our model in which ﬁrm output had two components: current cash ﬂow θf(K)
and undepreciated capital (1−δ)K. Assume that the manager is able to spend up to fraction
τ of undisbursed cash ﬂow on perquisites, but that he cannot divert undepreciated capital
for his own use. In this variant of the model, the constraint (2) on payments to the manager
would be modiﬁed to read
u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) ≥ u(τ(θf(K) − v0(ˆ θ))) for all ˆ θ / ∈ M, and
u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) ≥ u(τ(θf(K) − v1(ˆ θ,θ))) for all ˆ θ ∈ M,
and the limited liability constraint (1) would be modiﬁed to read
v0(ˆ θ) ≤ ˆ θf(K)+( 1− δ)K, v1(ˆ θ,θ) ≤ θf(K)+( 1− δ)K, and x(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ 0.
It is straightforward to show that the optimal contract in this variant of the model would break
down into four payments as before, except in this case, the performance pay to the manager
would be based on cash ﬂow θf(K) and not on the value of the ﬁrm (which includes the value
of undepreciated capital). It is also straightforward in this variant of the model to interpret
the payments v backed by undepreciated capital (1−δ)K as payments to collateralized debt.
It is worth noting, however, that our model does not have predictions regarding the optimal
mix of collateralized and uncollateralized debt.
175. Capital Structure, Production and Monitoring
The standard result due to Modigliani and Miller (19??) is that in a frictionless
world, the capital structure of a ﬁrm has no impact on its eﬃcient production plan. Here we
have assumed speciﬁc frictions that determine the optimal capital structure of the ﬁrm. In
this section, we discuss the impact of these frictions of the ﬁrm’s eﬃcient production plan
as characterized in Proposition 3 below. In particular, we show that, under the optimal
production plan, there is a wedge between the expected marginal product of capital within
the ﬁrm and the opportunity cost of capital. Our main result is that the magnitude of this
w e d g ec a nb em e a s u r e di nt e r m so fe l e m e n t so ft h eﬁrm’s capital structure and its executive
compensation.
We refer to an economy in which the monitoring cost γ =0as a frictionless envi-
ronment. I ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n t ,t h eo p t i m a lc o n t r a c ts p e c i ﬁes that the outside investors
monitor the output of the project in the second sub-period for all values of ˆ θ and pay the
manager constant compensation ¯ w independent of the realized value of θ. In this friction-
less environment, the eﬃcient capital stock satisﬁes F0(K)=r. In contrast, with ﬁnancial
frictions, there is a wedge between the marginal product of capital and its rental rate. We
characterize this wedge in proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Assume that the support of θ in unbounded above. Then, under the optimal
contract, F0(K) >r .


















With this result and the assumption that the expectation of θ is 1, this ﬁrst order condition
















Note ¯ w is ﬁnite as long as the manager’s reservation utility is ﬁnite. Hence the assumption
that the support of θ is unbounded above implies that P(¯ θ) < 1. Thus, since
0 < 1 −
u0 [τ(θ − θ∗)F(K)]
u0 (¯ w)













Hence, F0(K) >r . Q.E.D.
Note that the assumption that the support of θ is unbounded above is suﬃcient to
ensure that F0(K) >r ,but it is not necessary. What is necessary is that either P(θ∗) > 0 or
P(¯ θ) < 1, so that either there is monitoring or there is not perfect risk sharing.
From (14), one can see that there are two parts to this wedge between F0(K) and r.
The ﬁrst part is the expected loss due to monitoring given by γP(θ∗). This loss is a cost of
19debt since the monitoring that debt requires in the event of bankruptcy results in a loss of
output. The second part of the wedge is the loss due to ineﬃcient risk-sharing between the
outside investors and the manager that arises as a result of the performance component of
the manager’s compensation. Speciﬁcally, this is the loss due to the fact that the risk averse
manager places a lower valuation on the state contingent component of his compensation










To interpret this term, observe that the outside investors value the manager’s option at
R ∞
¯ θ τ(θ − θ∗)p(θ)dθ. In contrast, the payment of τ (θ − θ∗) to the manager in the event that
productivity θ > ¯ θ is realized raises the manager’s utility by u0 [τ(θ − θ∗)F(K)]τ(θ−θ∗) and
hence relaxes the promise keeping constraint by an amount that is worth only




to the outside investors.
Log Preference Example: If we assume that u(c)=l o g ( c), then the ﬁrst order










Hence, in this case the wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rental rate on
capital is given by one minus the sum of the fraction of expected output (F(K)) devoted to
20the monitoring cost and the fraction of expected output paid to the manager as the option
portion of his compensation. Thus, in this example, it is a simple matter to link our model’s
implications for the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on eﬃcient production plans to observables.
We turn next to the determination of the optimal extent of monitoring. The ﬁrst
order-condition of (10) with respect to θ∗ can be written as follows once we substitute for











This condition implies that under the eﬃcient contract, θ∗ is determined by a trade-oﬀ be-
tween the marginal cost of monitoring as captured by the right hand side of the above
expression, and the marginal impact of monitoring on the cost of distorting the manager’s
consumption, as captured by the left hand side of the above expression.
6. The Dynamic Contracting Problem
We now consider the optimal contracting problem in a dynamic extension of our one
period model. In this section we show that the optimal dynamic contract is quite similar
to the optimal static contract in that it can be broken down into four payments: base pay
and performance pay for the manager, debt, and outside equity. We then show that the
manager’s pay is non-decreasing over time. In this section, we keep our problem simple by
assuming that all managers are equally productive in running the ﬁrm. In a later section, we
introduce the possibility that the incumbent manager in the ﬁrm may, at random, become
unproductive at running the ﬁrm. With this further extension of the model, we show how
21a “golden parachute” forms part of the optimal package of executive compensation. In the
next section, we discuss several issues concerning the interpretation of an optimal contract
in this dynamic setting as a theory of the capital structure of the ﬁrm.
The extension of our one period model to a dynamic setting is as follows. Each period
consists of three sub-periods as described above. In the ﬁrst sub-period, the outside investors
hire a manager to run the project and put forward capital. In the second sub-period, the
current productivity shock θ, and hence current output y = θF(K), is realized, and these
values are observed only by the manager. The manager makes some payment to the outside
investors in this second sub-period. At the end of the second sub-period, the manager has
the option of investing up to fraction τ of the remaining output of the ﬁrm into perks that he
consumes and otherwise he reinvests the remaining output of the ﬁrm at gross rate of return
one. In the third sub-period, the realized value of the shock θ becomes public information, as
well as the manager’s division of the ﬁrm’s output between perks and productive reinvestment.
The manager is paid in this third sub-period. This production process is then repeated in
subsequent periods. We interpret this cycle of information about production as corresponding
to an accounting cycle or a capital budgeting cycle within the ﬁrm.
We assume that all managers not running a project have an outside opportunity to
enjoy consumption ¯ c each period. Corresponding to this consumption ﬂow is a reservation
expected discounted utility level U0. Individual rationality requires that new managers can
expect utility of at least U0 under a contract and that incumbent managers can expect a
utility of at least U0 in the continuation of any contract.
We present a recursive characterization of the optimal dynamic contract. Accordingly,
we assume that the incumbent manager is indexed by a utility level U promised him from this
22period forward under the contract the previous period. This utility level is a contractual state
variable carried over from the previous period and hence is determined before the realization
of the productivity shock θ. We let V (U) denote the expected discounted value of payments
to outside investors given utility promise of U to the incumbent manager.
A dynamic contract has the following elements. Given the utility U promised to the
incumbent manager as a state variable, the contract speciﬁes a monitoring region M(U) with
indicator function m(ˆ θ;U) indicating the monitoring decision as a function of the manager’s
report, payments from the manager to the outside investors in the second subperiod v0(ˆ θ;U)
if there is no monitoring and v1(ˆ θ,θ;U) if there is monitoring, and payments from the outside
investors to the manager in the third subperiod x(ˆ θ,θ;U). The recursive representation of
the contract also speciﬁes continuation utilities Z(ˆ θ,θ;U) for the incumbent manager. In
what follows, we suppress reference to U where there is no risk of confusion.
These terms of the contract are chosen subject to the limited liability constraints (1).
Since the incumbent manager can always quit and take his outside opportunity in the next
period, we have an individual rationality constraint
Z(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ U0 for all ˆ θ,θ (17)
We require that the contract deliver the promised utility U to the incumbent manager
Z
[u(x(θ,θ)) + βZ(θ,θ)]p(θ)dθ = U. (18)
The incumbent manager must be induced to truthfully report θ in the second sub-period.
23Hence we have incentive constraints, for all θ and ˆ θ / ∈ M such that ˆ θ is feasible in that
θ ≥ v0(ˆ θ)/F(K),
u(x(θ,θ)) + βZ(θ,θ) ≥ u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) + βZ(ˆ θ,θ). (19)
Finally, there is a dynamic analog to the constraint (2) arising from the assumption that the
manager can spend fraction τ of whatever resources are left in the project at the end of the
second sub-period on perks that he enjoys. This constraint is given by
u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) + βZ(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ u(τ(θF(K) − v1(ˆ θ,θ))) + βU0 if ˆ θ ∈ M (20)
u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) + βZ(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ u(τ(θF(K) − v0(ˆ θ))) + βU0 if ˆ θ / ∈ M
for all θ and for all ˆ θ / ∈ M such that v0(ˆ θ) ≤ θF(K). Here we have used the requirement that
the manager’s continuation utility cannot be driven down below U0 in the left-hand side of
(20) to compute the manager’s utility in the event that he invests in perks and then is ﬁred
as a consequence.
The terms of the dynamic contract are chosen to maximize the expected discounted
payments to the outside investors. This problem is to choose K, m(ˆ θ),v 0(ˆ θ),v 1(ˆ θ,θ),x (ˆ θ,θ),
and Z(ˆ θ,θ) to maximize
V (U)=m a x
Z ½





p(θ)dθ − rK (21)
subject to the constraints (1), (17), (18), (19), and (20).
24In the remainder of this section, we characterize elements of an eﬃcient dynamic
contract. In proposition 4, we show that the optimal dynamic contract is similar to the
optimal static contract in that the monitoring set is an interval from 0 to θ∗, and payments
i nt h es e c o n ds u b - p e r i o da r eg i v e nb yv1(ˆ θ,θ)=θF(K) if there is monitoring and v0(ˆ θ)=
θ∗F(K) where θ∗ ≡ inf
n
ˆ θ|ˆ θ / ∈ M
o
i ft h e r ei sn om o n i t o r i n g . T h el i n eo fa r g u m e n th e r ei s
similar to that in proposition 1.
In proposition 5, we discuss the manager’s pay and retention. We show that the man-
ager’s pay consists again of a constant base pay level denoted ¯ w a n dt h e na ni n c r e a s i n gp o r t i o n
of pay if a suﬃciently high realization of θ occurs. The line of argument on compensation is
similar to that for Proposition 2. We also show that, under the optimal dynamic contract, if
β ≥ 1/R, then the pay to the incumbent manager is non-decreasing over time.
Proposition 4. There is an eﬃcient contract with the following properties: (i) v1(ˆ θ,θ)=
θF(K) for all ˆ θ ∈ M and v0(ˆ θ)=θ∗F(K), where θ∗ ≡ inf
n
ˆ θ|ˆ θ / ∈ M
o
, (ii) M is an interval
ranging from 0 to θ∗, and (iii) x(ˆ θ,θ)=0and Z(ˆ θ,θ)=U0 for ˆ θ 6= θ and ˆ θ ∈ M and
x(ˆ θ,θ)=τ(θ − θ∗)F(K) and Z(ˆ θ,θ)=U0 for ˆ θ 6= θ and ˆ θ / ∈ M.
Proof: The proof here is quite similar to the proof of proposition 1. For all ˆ θ ∈ M, setting
v1(ˆ θ,θ)=θF(K) relaxes the constraint (20) as much as possible and has no eﬀect on the
objective (21) nor on any other constraint. Again deﬁne v∗
0 =i n f
n
v0(ˆ θ)|ˆ θ / ∈ M
o
and θ∗ =
inf {θ|θ / ∈ M}. Observe that to relax the constraint (19) as much as possible, the manager’s
utility following a misreporting of ˆ θ 6= θ should be set as low as possible. Given (1), (17),
25and (20), this gives x(ˆ θ,θ)=0 ,Z (ˆ θ,θ)=U0 for ˆ θ 6= θ and ˆ θ ∈ M, and
u(x(ˆ θ,θ)) + βZ(ˆ θ,θ)=u(τ(θF(K) − v
∗
0)) + βU0 (22)
for ˆ θ / ∈ M, and θ ≥ v∗
0/F(K). Again, holding ﬁxed the monitoring set, setting v∗
0 as high as is
feasible relaxes this constraint as much as possible. Since feasibility requires that θ∗F(K) ≥
v∗
0, this gives us that under an optimal contract, v∗
0 = θ∗F(K).T h a tM is an interval follows
f r o mt h ea r g u m e n tt h a ti n c l u d i n gs o m eθ > θ∗ in the monitoring set does nothing to relax
(22) and does require resources for monitoring. That x(ˆ θ,θ)=τ(θ − θ∗)F(K) for ˆ θ 6= θ,
ˆ θ / ∈ M follows from the result that v∗
0 = θ∗F(K).Q . E . D .
With this proposition, we can write our optimal contracting problem more simply as
one of choosing capital K, the upper support of the monitoring set θ∗, current managerial
pay w(θ)=x(θ,θ), and continuation values W(θ)=Z(θ,θ) to maximize the payoﬀ to the
outside investors








∗) − rK (23)
subject to the promise-keeping constraint
Z
[u(w(θ)) + βW(θ)]p(θ)dθ = U (24)
the dynamic no-perks constraint
u(w(θ)) + βW(θ) ≥ u(τ (θ − θ
∗)F(K)) + βU0, (25)
26As in the static case, we can derive several results regarding the characteristics of
managerial compensation from the ﬁrst order conditions of this problem. These characteristic
include that managerial pay consists of base pay plus a performance based component and
that pay for the incumbent manager is non-decreasing over time.
Proposition 5. There is an optimal contract under which there is a cutoﬀ ¯ θ together with
a level of base pay ¯ w f o rt h em a n a g e rs u c ht h a tw(θ)=¯ w and the continuation values W(θ)
are also constant at ¯ W for θ ≤ ¯ θ.B o t hw(θ) and W(θ) a r ei n c r e a s i n gf o rθ > ¯ θ. If βR ≥ 1,
then managerial pay w(θ)F(K) is non-decreasing over time.
Proof: The proof is quite similar to that of proposition 2 and follows from the ﬁrst order
conditions of the optimal contracting problem. Let λ be the Lagrangian multiplier on the
constraint (18) and ρδ(θ)p(θ) the Lagrangian multipliers on the constraints (25). The ﬁrst
order conditions of this problem with respect to w(θ) and W(θ) are







0(W(θ)) = β(λ + δ(θ)).
These ﬁrst order condition imply that w(θ) and W(θ) are constant unless the constraint (25)
binds. Note that since u(τ (θ − θ∗)F(K)) + βU0 is increasing in θ, there is a cutoﬀ ¯ θ such
that this constraint does not bind for θ ≤ ¯ θ and binds for θ > ¯ θ. When the constraint (25)







a n d( 2 5 )a sa ne q u a l i t y .H e n c e ,w(θ) and W(θ) are both increasing in θ when this constraint
binds. To prove that if βR =1 , then w(θ) is non-decreasing over time, we use the envelope






where ¯ w0 and F(K0) are next period’s values of these variables. Hence ¯ w0 ≥ w(θ), which gives
our result.
Note that this proposition implies that performance bonuses paid in one period are
incorporated into the manager’s base pay in future periods.
Remark 1. Because there is complete resolution of uncertainty at the end of each period, it is
straightforward to extend the model to allow for persistence in the idiosyncratic productivity
shock.
To be concrete, assume that the production shock follows a Markov process, and
therefore the c.d.f. P(θ;θ−1) and p.d.f. p(θ;θ−1) are conditional on the prior periods shock
θ−1. This time dependence in the shock would mean that the return to the outside investors
and the elements of the eﬃcient contract would be functions of both the ex-ante promised
utility U and the prior period’s shock θ−1.
287. Capital structure in the dynamic model
In this section, we discuss two issues that arise in interpreting an eﬃcient contract
in our model as a theory of the capital structure of the ﬁrm and the compensation of the
ﬁrm’s manager. The ﬁrst of these issues concerns our model’s implications for the optimal
debt-equity ratio of the ﬁrm. We show here that while our model does have implications for
the payments to debt and equity holders, it does not pin down the debt-equity ratio of the
ﬁrm. The second of these issues concerns the interpretation of the monitoring of the ﬁrm by
outside investors as bankruptcy.
Our dynamic model delivers a theory of the division of the gross payments out of
an ongoing ﬁrm between holders of the ﬁrm’s debt, outside equity, and the ﬁrm’s manager.
This division of gross payments is not suﬃcient, however, to pin down the relative value of
the ﬁrm’s debt and equity. This is because our model does not pin down whether it is the
debt holders or the outside equity holders who pay for the investments K in future periods.
This issue is not new to our model and can arise in any ﬁnancial contract in which there are
multiple ﬂows out of the ﬁrm.
We illustrate this problem with the following simple example. Imagine that an entre-
preneur has created a project that can be operated for 2 periods in which an investment of 1
at the beginning of each period produces an output of 2 at the end of each period. Assume
that this entrepreneur sells this project to outside investors after having made the initial in-
vestment at the beginning of period 1 and that there is no discounting, so that the total value
of this project is equal to 3 units of output (2 units of output in period 1 plus two more units
in period 2 less 1 unit of investment in period 2). Hence, it is clear in a competitive capital
market, the outside investors must pay the entrepreneur 3 units of output at the beginning
29o fp e r i o d1t op u r c h a s et h i sp r o j e c t .W h a ti st ob ed e t e r m i n e di st h ed i v i s i o no ft h i sv a l u e
between outside investors who hold debt and outside investors who hold equity. Imagine
further that a theory such has ours has yielded the implication that, each period, the gross
output of 2 is divided equally between debt and equity holders, so 1 unit is paid to the debt
holders and 1 unit is paid to the equity holders. As the following examples make clear, the
division of the value of this ﬁrm between debt and equity is not pinned down under these
assumptions, despite the fact that the division of the gross payments to the outside investors
is pinned down.
To see this, assume ﬁr s tt h a tt h eﬁrm is ﬁnanced with a combination of short-term
debt and equity. In particular, assume that short-term debt holders lend one unit at the
beginning of each period and are repaid that one unit at the end of each period. In period 1,
the equity holders pay 2 units to the entrepreneur to purchase the project and the remainder
of the purchase is ﬁnanced with the ﬁrst issuance of 1 unit of short-term debt. The equity
holders in this case receive a dividend of one unit each period in exchange for their investment
while the investment of 1 unit required at the beginning of the second period is ﬁnanced by
a second issuance of short-term debt at the beginning of period 2. Under these assumptions,
in the ﬁrst period, after the initial investment of 1 unit has been made, the value of the debt
is 1 unit and the value of the equity is 2 units.
Next assume that the investment of one unit in the ﬁrm at the beginning of the second
period is ﬁnanced by the outside equity holders (through retained earnings) while the debt
is long-term debt. In this case, to purchase this project, one group of outside investors puts
forward 2 units of output in exchange for a long-term debt claim that pays 1 unit at the
end of each of the two periods while another group of outside investors puts forward 1 unit
30of output in exchange for an equity stake that pays no dividend in the ﬁrst period and a
dividend of 1 unit at the end of the second period. The three units of output raised in this
way are used to purchase the project from the entrepreneur. Under this ﬁnancing scheme,
the ﬁrm’s debt is worth 2 units and the ﬁrm’s equity is worth 1 unit.
As this simple example makes clear, under diﬀerent assumptions about the division of
responsibility for ongoing investments in the ﬁrm, one obtains diﬀerent implications for the
debt-equity ratio of the ﬁrm. We conjecture that this issue will arise in any well-speciﬁed
“trade-oﬀ” theory of optimal capital structure.
In interpreting our eﬃcient contract as a theory of capital structure, we associate
monitoring with bankruptcy. Monitoring in our model occurs whenever the current gross
output of the ﬁrm fall below a threshold θ∗F(K) determined by the optimal contract. In our
one-period version of the model, in the event that θ ≤ θ∗, monitoring occurred, all of the
remaining value of the ﬁrm was paid to debt-holders and the outside equity holders received
nothing. In this sense, in the one-period model, monitoring corresponds to a stylized notion
of bankruptcy. In a multi-period version of our model, the division of the value of the ﬁrm
between debt and equity holders in the event of monitoring is not so stark. In the event that
θ ≤ θ∗, monitoring occurs, but the ﬁrm still has a value to the outside investors as an ongoing
concern (denoted by the continuation value V (W(θ))). In the event that this continuation
value exceeds the face value of the debt, then the equity holders emerge from this episode
of bankruptcy with shares that still have positive value. In this sense, monitoring in the
dynamic model does not necessarily correspond to the liquidation of the ﬁrm. Of course, the
same is true of bankruptcy in the data.
318. Retention and Golden Parachutes
We now extend our dynamic model to include a decision whether to retain the man-
ager. This decision is contingent on the realization of an observable shock that aﬀects the
productivity of the incumbent manager in running the ﬁrm. Outside investors have an in-
centive to retain incumbent managers with high productivity and replace those with low
productivity. We show that a golden parachute type payment to an incumbent manager who
becomes unproductive and is ﬁred is part of the optimal compensation scheme.
To extend the model, we assume that each period, the incumbent manager who has
been running the project experiences a shock η ∈ {0,1} at the beginning of the period to
his productivity with this project, so that the project’s output is given by ηθF(K). This
shock η is observable to all parties. This shock follows a Markov process in which η =0is
an absorbing state and the probability that η =1in the current period given that η =1
in the previous period is given by ρ. As we show below, along the equilibrium path, the
outside investors choose to continue with the incumbent manager if η =1and they hire a
new manager if η =0 . Hence, in what follows we suppress reference to η where there is no
risk of confusion.
With this alteration to our model, we need to include additional terms in the contract
between the outside investors and the manager. In particular, we need to include a payment
from the outside investors make to the incumbent manager in the event that he is not retained
as well as notation for the cost to the outside investors of hiring a new manager. Let ˜ V (wF)
denote the indirect lifetime utility of the incumbent manager in the event that he is not
retained and paid wF. We assume that ˜ V (0) ≤ U0, that is that an incumbent manager
who has been ﬁred with no severance pay gets no more than the reservation utility of an
32unemployed manager.
Since our results characterizing an eﬃcient contract in proposition 4 carry over here,
we can express the problem of choosing the optimal contract as one of choosing contract
terms w(θ), θ∗,K ,W (θ) ≥ U0 together with the payment that a manager receives if he is
not retained wF so as to maximize the objective








subject to the promise-keeping constraint
ρU
R +( 1− ρ)˜ V (w
F)=U. (26)
Here V R is notation for the value of retaining the incumbent manager when that manager
















[u(w(θ)) + βW(θ)]p(θ)dθ = U
R (28)
33and the dynamic no-perks constraint
u(w(θ)) + βW(θ) ≥ u(τ (θ − θ
∗)F(K)) + βU0. (29)
The term V0 denotes the value to the outside investors of hiring a new manager (with η =1
and U = U0) and is deﬁned as the solution to the problem of choosing w0(θ), θ∗











0) − rK0 (30)
subject to
Z
[u(w0(θ)) + βW0(θ)]p(θ)dθ = U0 (31)
and the constraint (29).
In the next proposition, we establish the optimality of a golden parachute payment to
incumbent managers who have become unproductive.
Proposition 6. In the event that η =0 , then the manager’s pay satisﬁes ˜ V 0(w0)=u0(¯ w).
Proof: Let λ be the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint (26). From the ﬁrst












where ¯ w is the base pay to the manager if he is retained.
This proposition implies that the optimal golden parachute payment to an incumbent
manager who has been unproductive should be large enough to allow him to maintain the
living standard that was guaranteed in his base pay. The optimal size of this golden parachute
payment will be larger, then, the more limited the outside options of the manager in the event
that he is not retained.
9. Comparative Statics
We now consider how the terms of the optimal contract for ﬁnancing the ﬁrm depend
on the parameters τ,U 0, and γ governing the severity of the agency problem and the costs
of monitoring the output of the ﬁrm. We focus on the one-period contracting problem. In
general, these comparative statics depend on the parameters of the manger’s utility, the
distribution of shocks θ, and the production function F. We present analytic results here
under the assumption that the manager’s utility is CRRA, the distribution of shocks θ is
uniform, and the optimal choice of capital K is ﬁxed. With K ﬁxed, the contract terms that
vary are base pay ¯ w, the set of states θ < θ∗ for which monitoring occurs, and the set of states
35θ > ¯ θ for which the manager receives a performance bonus. These contract terms maximize
max
¯ w,¯ θ,θ∗ F(K)
Z ∞
0











∗)F(K))p(θ)dθ = U0 (33)
and
¯ w = τ(¯ θ − θ
∗)F(K) (34)
Proposition 7. Assume that u(c)=( c1−φ − 1)/(1 − φ), θ is uniformly distributed, and
F(K)=m i n{K,1}. If ¯ w and θ∗ are an interior solution of the problem (32) and the optimal
choice of K is ﬁxed at 1,t h e n
1. monitoring θ∗ and the bonus cutoﬀ ¯ θ are increasing in the perks parameter τ. The eﬀect
on base pay ¯ w is ambiguous.
2. base pay ¯ w is increasing and monitoring θ∗ and the bonus cutoﬀ ¯ θ are decreasing in the
reservation utility U0
3. base pay ¯ w is increasing and monitoring θ∗ and the bonus cutoﬀ ¯ θ a r ei n c r e a s i n gi nt h e
monitoring cost γ
Proof: We proof this proposition by diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order conditions deter-
mining the optimal choice of contract terms. We use (34) to substitute out for ¯ w in (32) and
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where ¯ c is deﬁned to solve u(c0)=U0. Using the homogeneity of the CRRA utility function,
























Diﬀerentiating these equations with respect to ¯ θ,θ∗ and the parameters τ,c 0, and γ gives
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u0(θ − θ∗)



















0(¯ θ − θ
∗)P(¯ θ)d¯ θ −
·
u























37First observe that with θ uniform p0(θ∗)=0a n dw i t hC R R Ap r e f e r e n c e s ,u00(θ − θ∗) is
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and with K and parameters τ and γ ﬁxed, (35) deﬁnes implicitly a function θ∗
1(¯ θ) with slope
everywhere strictly greater than 1. Likewise, with K and parameters τ and γ ﬁxed, (36)
deﬁnes implicitly a function θ∗
2(¯ θ) with positive slope everywhere strictly less than 1. Since
any interior solution of (35) and (36) is found at an intersection of θ∗
1(¯ θ) and θ∗
2(¯ θ),a n ys u c h
solution is unique.
We now solve for the comparative statics by analyzing how shifts in the parameters
τ,γ, and c0 shift the implicit functions θ∗
1(¯ θ) and θ∗
2(¯ θ). Observe that because the slope of
θ∗
1(¯ θ) is everywhere greater than the slope of θ∗
2(¯ θ) w h i c hi nt u r ni sg r e a t e rt h a nz e r o ,as h i f ti n
parameters that raises the function θ∗
1(¯ θ) and leaves θ∗
2(¯ θ) unchanged lowers the equilibrium
θ∗ and ¯ θ. Moreover, the equilibrium ¯ θ falls by more than the equilibrium θ∗. Likewise, a shift
in parameters that raises θ∗
2(¯ θ) and leaves θ∗
1(¯ θ) unchanged raises the equilibrium θ∗ and ¯ θ
and the increase in θ∗ is larger than the increase in ¯ θ.
The comparative statics are the derived as follows. From (37) we see that an increase
in τ lowers θ∗
1(¯ θ), while from (38) we that that an increase in τ raises θ∗
2(¯ θ). The fall in θ∗
1(¯ θ)
by itself raises θ∗ and ¯ θ, with the implied increase in ¯ θ larger than the increase in θ∗. The
increase in θ∗
2(¯ θ) by itself also raises θ∗ and ¯ θ, but now the implied increase in θ∗ is larger
than the implied increase in ¯ θ. Hence we get that an increase in τ increases both ¯ θ and θ∗,
with the net eﬀect on base pay ¯ w = τ(¯ θ − θ∗) depending on parameters.
38An increase in the manager’s reservation utility U0, or equivalently an increase in c0,
only aﬀects (36) and hence θ∗
2(¯ θ). From (38), we see that an increase in c0 lowers θ∗
2(¯ θ), leading
t oaf a l li nθ∗ and ¯ θ, with the fall in ¯ θ being smaller than the fall in θ∗. Hence, base pay ¯ w
rises.
An increase in the monitoring cost γ only aﬀects (35) and hence θ∗
1(¯ θ). From (37) we
see that an increase in γ lowers θ∗
1(¯ θ) and hence raises θ∗ and ¯ θ, with the increase in ¯ θ being
larger than the increase in θ∗. Hence base pay ¯ w rises. Q.E.D.
In this proposition, we have assumed that the optimal choice of capital is ﬁxed. In
general, we cannot obtain analytic comparative statics when capital is variable because the
relationship between changes in θ∗, ¯ θ, and K depends on parameters. This is easiest to
see if we assume that preferences are logarithmic, so the ﬁrst order condition determining
the optimal capital stock K reduces to (15). Each of the comparative static exercises we
considered above resulted in either an increase in both θ∗ and ¯ θ or a decrease in both θ∗ and
¯ θ. From (15), however, we see that the impact on the optimal choice of K from an increase in
both θ∗ and ¯ θ is ambiguous – increasing θ∗ increases the probability of costly monitoring and
hence reduces the optimal choice of K while increasing ¯ θ improves risk sharing between the
manager and the outside investors and hence increases the optimal choice of K. If we assumed
that the manager was risk neutral, so that there was no problem of risk sharing between the
outside investors and the manager, it would be easy to show that if the manager’s reservation






39where K∗ is deﬁned by F0(K∗)=r, then the optimal contract is fully eﬃcient with no
monitoring and the terms of the contract do not change with marginal changes in τ,γ, and






the optimal choice for base pay ¯ w is zero, so that ¯ θ = θ∗, and the optimal choices of θ∗ and









Under this assumption of risk neutrality, an increase in τ r e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nθ∗ and a
decrease in K, an increase in c0 results in a decrease in θ∗ a n da ni n c r e a s ei nK, while an
increase in γ leads to a decrease in θ∗ and a decrease in K.
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